nexusmarkettorReference procedures for using Nexus Market over Tor
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Archive > Operations and risk > NM-012

NM-012: Vendor assessment procedure

IdentifierNM-012
Versionv1.0 · stable
SubjectsOperations and risk, counterparty evaluation (NMT.ops)
Last updated22 Jul 2026
Applies toNexus Market, running since 2023, 2 of 3 multisig escrow
AbstractSpecifies what to read on a vendor profile and in what order, distinguishes the fields carrying information from those that do not, and defines a first order policy.

1. Rationale

Structural controls in this archive reduce risk from the market. None of them reduce risk from the specific counterparty, which is where most of the remaining variance sits. Buyers routinely spend more effort choosing a market than choosing the vendor they will actually transact with.

2. Reading order

  1. Completed order count together with the period it accumulated over, since rate matters as much as total
  2. Recency of positive feedback, because a profile can coast on reputation while current performance has declined
  3. Handling of negative feedback, which is the highest information field on any profile
  4. Whether the listing states terms at all, including dispatch windows and what happens if a package does not arrive

3. Fields carrying little information

  • Aggregate rating alone, which is shaped by who bothers to leave feedback rather than by typical experience
  • Uniformly perfect and uniformly brief feedback, which reads as manufactured
  • Listing presentation quality, which is unrelated to fulfilment

4. First order policy

Cap the first order with any untested counterparty. A small order costs a fraction of a large one and produces exactly the same information about whether this vendor does what they said. Losses to vendors overwhelmingly occur on first orders rather than fifth ones.

5. Refusal conditions

Decline where the counterparty asks for payment release before delivery, pushes communication off the market, or applies time pressure. None of these are conclusive individually and all of them correlate with the outcomes this procedure exists to avoid.

Verified address set

Verified address set
[1]nexusb2l7fmqnefwphyy7m5zjhlkytlbo7qbb5lu5dlczr3azgii2gyd.onion
[2]nexusma2iegzo7atzwbrwxhcdopyri3vare2twibldnlc3txqjdeb5yd.onion
[3]nexusabcd6tyfhdwilyitaqiri6tisj2v2hueyjuj6qkvd6azvi5tuqd.onion

Required check. Open in Tor Browser only. Before entering anything, compare the onion printed on the login screen against your browser address bar. A mismatch means the page is a copy and the tab should be closed. See NM-004.

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