Archive > Addresses
The addresses this archive treats as verified. All of them are entry points to one service, so the account, balance and open orders are identical behind each.
nexusb2l7fmqnefwphyy7m5zjhlkytlbo7qbb5lu5dlczr3azgii2gyd.onionnexusma2iegzo7atzwbrwxhcdopyri3vare2twibldnlc3txqjdeb5yd.onionnexusabcd6tyfhdwilyitaqiri6tisj2v2hueyjuj6qkvd6azvi5tuqd.onionRequired check. Open in Tor Browser only. Before entering anything, compare the onion printed on the login screen against your browser address bar. A mismatch means the page is a copy and the tab should be closed. See NM-004.
Having a good address is half the control. The other half is confirming the page you land on is the service rather than a copy, which is done by comparing the onion printed on the login screen against your browser address bar. The reasoning is set out in NM-004 and the reason it cannot be defeated is that a copy has to live at its own address while your browser reports where you actually are.
A hidden service reachable at a single address stops being reachable when that address is flooded. Several live simultaneously means an attacker has to hold all of them at once. The full description is in NM-002, and the classification of failures when one does not respond is in NM-003.